The shift occurred as MARA held approximately 52,850 BTC on Sept. 30, paid around $0.04 per kilowatt-hour at its owned sites, and recorded a purchased-energy cost per Bitcoin of around $39,235 in the third quarter as network difficulty increased.
Transaction fees contributed just 0.9% of mining revenue in the quarter, underlining weak fee tailwinds. Cash usage was heavy year-to-date, with approximately $243 million allocated to property and equipment, $216 million in advances to vendors, and a $36 million wind asset purchase, all of which were funded alongside $1.6 billion in financing.
Real capital expenditure and liquidity needs now coexist with lower hash economics.
The timing matters because pressures are building across the mining cohort, and the ingredients are in place for miners to add to the same sell-side impulse visible in ETF redemptions.
The effect is uneven across operators, but Marathon’s explicit pivot from pure accumulation to tactical monetization offers a template for what happens when margin squeeze meets elevated capital commitments.
Industry profitability tightened in November. Hashprice fell to a multi-month low this week, at around $43.1 per petahash per second, as the Bitcoin price slid, fees remained subdued, and hashrate continued to climb.
That’s a classic margin squeeze pattern. Revenue per unit of hash falls while the denominator of competition rises, and fixed costs, such as power and debt service, remain constant.
For miners without access to cheap power or external financing, the path of least resistance is to sell a greater share of their production rather than holding and hoping for a price recovery.
The trade-off is treasury versus operations. Holding Bitcoin works when its appreciation outpaces the opportunity cost of selling to fund capital expenditures or service debt.
When the hash price falls below the cash cost plus capital needs, holding becomes a bet that the price recovers before liquidity runs out. Marathon’s policy shift signals that bets no longer pencil at current margins.
The vulnerability lies in the fact that if more miners follow the same logic, monetizing production to stay current on commitments, the aggregate flow to exchanges adds supply at exactly the moment ETF redemptions are already pulling demand.
The divergence reflects power costs, financing access, and capital-allocation philosophy. Operators with power costs of less than $0.04 per kilowatt-hour and sufficient equity or debt capacity can weather margin compression without resorting to sales.
These contracts create non-Bitcoin revenue streams that can reduce reliance on coin sales. However, they also require significant near-term capital expenditures and working capital, and in the interim, treasury monetization remains a flexible lever.
CryptoQuant dashboards indicate that miner-to-exchange activity increased in mid-October and early November.
One widely cited data point indicates that roughly 51,000 BTC have been sent from miner wallets to Binance since Oct. 9. This doesn’t prove immediate selling, but it raises near-term supply overhang, and ETF context matters for scale.
CoinShares’ latest weekly report flagged approximately $360 million in net outflows from crypto ETPs, with Bitcoin products accounting for roughly $946 million in negative net inflows, while Solana saw strong inflows.
That Bitcoin figure equates to over 9,000 BTC at $104,000, equivalent to about three days of post-halving miner issuance. A week where public miners lean harder on sales can meaningfully add to the same tape.
The mechanical effect is that miners are selling compounds, and ETF redemption pressure during the same window. ETF outflows remove primary market demand, and miner exchange deposits add secondary market supply.
When both move in the same direction, the net effect is to tighten liquidity, which can accelerate price declines. These declines then loop back to compress miner margins further, triggering additional sales.
The structural constraint is that miners can’t sell what they don’t mine, and daily issuance post-halving is capped.
At the current network hashrate, the total miner supply is roughly 450 BTC per day. Even if the entire cohort monetized 100% of production, which they won’t, the absolute flow is bounded.
The risk is concentration. If the largest holders decide to draw down the treasury rather than sell fresh production, the overhang grows.
Marathon’s 52,850 BTC, CleanSpark’s 13,033 BTC, and similar positions across Riot and Hut 8 represent months of accumulated issuance that could theoretically be released to exchanges if liquidity needs or strategic pivots dictate.
The second constraint is recovery speed. If the hash price and fee share rebound, either due to Bitcoin price appreciation or a mempool surge that increases transaction fees, miner economics can shift quickly.
Operators that held through the squeeze gain, and those that sold production at trough margins lock in losses. That asymmetry creates an incentive to avoid forced selling, but only if balance sheets can absorb the interim burn.
The stakes are whether margin compression and elevated capital commitments push enough miners into active selling to add to ETF redemption drag materially, or whether better-capitalized operators can finance through the squeeze without monetizing treasury.
Marathon’s explicit policy shift is the clearest signal yet that even large, well-funded miners are willing to sell production tactically when economics tighten.
If hash price and fee share remain depressed while power costs and CapEx outlays remain elevated, more miners will follow, especially those without access to cheap power or external financing.
Sustained miner exchange flows and any acceleration in treasury drawdowns should be treated as additive to outflow-driven weeks from ETFs.
If flows reverse and fees recover, the pressure eases quickly.
