The proposal is framed as diversification alongside kronor and gold, seeded partly with seized crypto. Additionally, it holds explicit skepticism about central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
Taken together, the clustered signals indicate that politicians in two advanced economies are testing sovereign BTC exposure within the same news cycle.
A US federal purchase program sized at 1 million BTC would equal approximately 4.76% of Bitcoin’s fixed 21 million supply and cost roughly $120 billion, for $120,000 per BTC.
Even a smaller pilot tranche would mechanically withdraw liquid supply, raise term scarcity, and tighten the float available to private buyers, effects that past state accumulations have hinted at.
El Salvador’s on-chain reserve, now slightly over 6,260 BTC, accounts for only about 0.03% of the total supply. However, its visibility made the idea of sovereign BTC ownership a real possibility to policymakers.
Cross-geo, the political signals rhyme even if the legal mechanics differ. Sweden’s motion routes through the Riksdag, and if taken up by the government, would likely be referred to the finance ministry and central bank for feasibility work alongside existing gold and foreign exchange frameworks.
The policy steps that would actually move macro relationships are straightforward and powerful.
First, there is a statutory authority to purchase and hold Bitcoin as a reserve asset, with clear mandates for custody, auditing, and reporting. Once a paramount sovereign can buy programmatically rather than opportunistically, supply absorption becomes predictable.
Second is a funding rule, whether budget-neutral mechanisms in the US or rebalancing rules in Europe, that automates the bid across cycles.
Third is a disclosure cadence similar to that of FX reserves data. Suppose markets can anchor on scheduled sovereign prints. In that case, BTC’s sensitivity to real yields can fall as “policy demand” partially replaces “risk appetite” demand, similar to how official sector gold buying has damped gold’s beta to rates at the margin.
Finally, reserve management guidelines that permit lending, swaps, or strategic liquidity provision would pull Bitcoin into the plumbing of public finance, broadening the set of price-insensitive balance sheets on the bid.
The upshot is that credible, sovereign demand would tend to weaken the historical inverse correlation between BTC and real yields during accumulation windows, with the sign and magnitude depending on the size and transparency of the program.
Sizing the ideas on the table gives perspective. The US proposal would amount to 4.76% of the supply.
Meanwhile, El Salvador’s disclosed holdings surpassed 6,260 BTC. The Czech governor’s experiment would capture 0.3% of the supply.
As a result, formalizing part of that as strategic reserves would not be “new” demand, but changing the mandate could alter global patterns.
Considering Bitcoin’s fixed supply and the global signals, a reserve race between the US and Europe is a plausible outcome. The test is whether parliaments and Congress convert talking points into purchase authority, funding rules, and disclosures that markets can model.
If they do, the repricing won’t just be about Bitcoin increasing in value because governments are buying. It will be about a new class of structurally price-insensitive actors refactoring how Bitcoin trades against real yields, FX, and risk assets.
